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I. INTRODUCTION
Two questions about remedies have, for the most part, escaped the attention
of practicing lawyers and commentators: (1) under what circumstances, if any,
should claims for restitution be filed rather than claims for compensation?; (2)
under what circumstances, if any, should recovery be sought for intangible gains?
Consider the following cases:
(1) Every single morning, Bob "The Bull" Connor stops Smith and
Jones as they enter the plant where they work. The Bull then asks
Smith, an African-American male, why he is not wearing his "water-
melon" tie. He also asks Jones, an attractive young woman, whether it
is "her time of month." Each time The Bull asks these questions, i.e.,
every single morning, a group of his buddies roars with laughter.
Regrettably, technical problems prevent both Jones and Smith from
recovering compensation from either The Bull or his employer for The
Bull's harassing conduct.
(2) Several months ago, Pecs, a remarkably handsome and muscular
young man, tricked Gotrocks, a wealthy but very elderly widow, into
giving him a priceless painting. That painting now hangs over the bed
in Pecs's flat and, not surprisingly, makes quite an impression on the
countless young women Pecs entertains when he is not conning elderly
widows. Gotrocks realizes her mistake; however, she also realizes that
the backlog of cases in the court system of her jurisdiction makes her
recovery against Pecs anytime before she dies highly unlikely.
(3) Because of a mistake made by a firm that specializes in finding the
owners of abandoned property, Hopkins, a university professor, obtained
title to a beautiful summer home on a small island in a lake in the
upper peninsula of Michigan. Hopkins used that home for several
summers before the true owner of the property discovered the mistake.
The true owner, a notorious recluse, owns hundreds and hundreds of
resort properties. He never actually uses any of them.
(4) Executives at Widget Company consciously chose to market a
product that they knew was likely to cause serious injury or death to a
small number of its potential users. These executives made this choice
because they determined that the extraordinary profits they would reap
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from the sale of this product would greatly exceed any liability that they
might incur. Further, they made this choice knowing that the courts in
their jurisdiction had a strong policy against awarding "punitive"
damages.
(5) Nerd, an extraordinarily gifted but naive graduate student, put off
his own educational plans for several years in order to prepare a
"preliminary report" for a major governmental project that Congressman
William "Billy Bob" Boondoggle was thinking of putting together.
Later, Billy Bob published a book on this project. The book caused a
nationwide sensation and, not surprisingly, did wonders for Billy Bob's
political reputation. However, despite the fact that this book was
nothing more than a verbatim copy of Nerd's preliminary report, Billy
Bob gave Nerd no credit whatsoever.
The following analysis attempts to answer both of the remedies questions
raised by these hypotheticals. For both functional and strategic reasons, the
analysis suggests that claims for restitution sometimes make much more sense
than claims for compensation. Further, in at least some situations, restitution
should be allowed for intangible gains. The analysis has three parts. The first
part contains a summary of the overall system of American civil remedies. This
picture reveals close connections between seemingly separate parts of that body
of law. The second section of the analysis describes, in somewhat more detail,
"restorative" or "restitutionary" remedies. It characterizes these kinds of
remedies as conceptually quite different from "compensatory" remedies. Further,
and more importantly, this part of the paper shows how skilled lawyers can use
restitutionary remedies to overcome serious problems that often arise in
connection with compensatory remedies. Finally, part three of the paper explores
the notion of intangibles generally. This part suggests that symmetry truly exists
between the law dealing with compensatory remedies and the law dealing with
restitutionary remedies in connection with intangibles.
II. A GENERAL PICTURE OF CIVIL REMEDIES
Most lawyers probably think that the best overall method for classifying civil
remedies starts with the distinction between "legal" remedies and "equitable"
remedies.' Unfortunately, however, this law/equity distinction really makes no
sense in the modem world. Although some technical distinctions still exist
between the methods used to obtain the so-called legal remedies versus the so-
called equitable remedies, these two historically separate systems have now, for
the most part, been combined. Hence, classification of civil remedies based on
a law/equity distinction is outdated.
1. See generally Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 1.2 (2d ed. 1993). See also Douglas
Laycock, Modem American Remedies: Cases and Materials (1985).
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Perhaps a better classification system for civil remedies would turn on the
present day functions of the various civil remedies rather than on their historic
origins. Such a functional system would concentrate upon what present day
remedies do, rather than upon what they are called. One function-based system
for classifying civil remedies, it is suggested, might look like this.
Civil
Remedies
[ Declaratory Act Remedies Money
Remedies I Remedies
All current civil remedies, this classification system suggests, can be thought
of as serving one of three conceptually distinct functions. First, one group of
civil remedies-which will be called "declaratory remedies"-provides successful
litigants with judicial orders declaring rights or responsibilities. A second
group-which will be called "act remedies"-provides successful litigants with
judgments ordering other people or entities to act or not act in certain ways.
The final group-which will be called "money remedies"-provides successful
litigants with judgments for money.
Declaratory remedies-the most common of which are "declaratory
judgments" and "interpleader"-need only brief comment here because they are
not widely used by most practicing lawyers. These remedies provide successful
litigants with judicial declarations of rights or responsibilities. Only one point
need be made here about this kind of remedy, a point that in significant part
explains why it is so rarely used. Whereas suits for declaratory remedies
produce only a declaration of rights or responsibilities, suits for money or act
remedies produce both a declaration of rights and responsibilities and a money
or act remedy. Thus, except in unusual situations, injured parties in a dispute,
i.e., traditional plaintiffs, are better served by seeking money or act remedies
rather than declaratory remedies. Conversely, injuring parties in a dispute, i.e.,
traditional defendants, generally cannot seek money or act remedies. Thus, if a
traditional defendant wants a judicial remedy in a particular situation-perhaps
to preempt litigation that he anticipates will be filed against him-he must file
suit for a declaration.
Act remedies-the most common of which are "injunctions" and "specific
performance"-are remedies that require a party to act or not act. Act remedies
themselves have three distinct functions.
Act Remedies
Prevention opestn Restoration
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First, litigants seeking to prevent future harm sometimes ask a court to require
someone or some entity to do or not do something in the future. The most
commonly granted act remedy aimed at preventing future harm requires someone
or some entity not to do something and is generally called a "prohibitory
injunction." Conversely, the other act remedy with the same purpose requires
someone or some entity to do something and is generally called a "mandatory
injunction." Second, litigants seeking compensation through actions for past
injury sometimes ask a court to order someone or some entity to do something
in addition to compensating. When contract law provides the basis for the
action, the remedy is generally called "specific performance." Conversely, when
tort law provides the basis for the action, the remedy is generally called a
"reparative injunction." Third, and finally, litigants seeking restoration of gains
reaped by opposing parties sometimes ask a court to order someone or some
entity actually to return the unjustly reaped gain. This kind of remedy is
generally called "specific restitution" or "replevin." It is rarely used.2
Money remedies, the last of the three distinct kinds of judicially imposed
civil remedies, also serve three distinct functions, two of which are identical to
those of act remedies.
Money Remedies
E ompensation Restoration unishment/I E Prevention
The first kind of money remedy, a kind often loosely called "damages,"
provides compensation for past injuries. This kind of money remedy, therefore,
does exactly the same thing as compensatory act remedies, i.e., compensates for
past injury. Thus, the only real difference between compensatory money
remedies ("damages") and compensatory act remedies ("reparative injunctions"
or "specific performance") is that in the former, compensation for the past injury
takes the form of money, whereas in the latter, compensation comes in acts. A
second kind of money remedy, a kind that is often loosely called "punitive
damages" or "exemplary damages," serves one of two related functions.
Sometimes punitive or exemplary damages are thought to punish for exceptional-
ly bad conduct, and sometimes they are thought to serve as a mechanism for
preventing future wrongful conduct. The punitive function of this kind of money
remedy reveals its relation to criminal law remedies. Conversely, the prevention
2. Whether this kind of remedy is rarely used because it has such a narrow function or
because it is simply unknown to most practicing lawyers cannot be determined. See Douglas
Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1277, 1279-83 (1989).
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function reveals that this kind of remedy is closely related to preventive
injunctions, the most important of the act remedies.3
The third distinct function of money remedies-the restorative or restitution-
ary function-seems to be unknown to most practicing lawyers. This function,
however, like the restorative or restitutionary function of certain kinds of act
remedies, is an extraordinarily important one.
III. RESTORATIVE OR RESTITUTIONARY REMEDIES
Restitutionary remedies4 are perhaps best described by contrasting them to
compensatory remedies. Compensatory remedies, it should be recalled, either
compensatory money or compensatory act remedies, deal with losses to injured
parties caused by past harm. Restitutionary remedies, on the other hand, either
restitutionary money or restitutionary act remedies, focus on recovery of gains
acquired by wrongdoers rather than recovery for losses to injured parties. Thus,
in connection with compensatory money remedies, courts turn past losses into
money, and in connection with compensatory act remedies, courts turn past
losses into acts. Conversely, in connection with restitutionary money remedies,
courts turn past gains into money, and in connection with restitutionary act
remedies, courts turn past gains into acts.
3. Dobbs, supra note 1, §§ 3.11(l)-3.11(3).
4. Perhaps the most provocative recent treatment of the law of restitution can be found in a
series of articles by Wendy Gordon. Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution,
and Intellectual Property, 21 J. Legal Stud. 449 (1992) [hereinafter Of Harms and Benefits); Wendy
J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L.
Rev. 149 (1992) [hereinafter On Owning Information]; Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits
of Copyright, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1343 (1989) [hereinafter An Inquiry]. The best short summary of the
basic rules in this body of law is Laycock, supra note 2. Two books deal with nothing but restitution
Lord Goff of Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution (3d ed. 1986); George E. Palmer,
The Law of Restitution (1978), and several books have lengthy discussions of that topic. See, e.g.,
Dobbs, supra note 1, §§ 4.1-4.5. Numerous scholarly articles comment on the law of restitution.
See, e.g., Robert Childres and Jack Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in
Contract, 64 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433 (1969); L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37); Lindsey R. Jeanblanc,
Restitution under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes a Legal Benefit, 26 Ind. L.J. 1 (1950)
[hereinafter Jeanblanc I]; Lindsey R. Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds:
Measurement of the Legal Benefit Unjustly Retained, 15 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1950) [hereinafter Jeanblanc
II]; Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 65 (1985); Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution
in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 37 (1981); Judy B. Sloan, Quantum
Meruit: Residual Equity in Law, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 399 (1992); John W. Wade, Restitution for
Benefits Conferred without Request, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1183 (1966). Many books on contract law,
as well as many books on tort law, also contain extensive discussions of the law of restitution. See,
e.g., John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts §§ 15.1-15.7 (3d ed. 1987); E. Allan
Farnsworth, Contracts §§ 12.19-12.20 (2d ed. 1990); John E. Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts § 126
(3d ed. 1990).
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Note carefully two critically important points about restitutionary remedies.
First, many judges and lawyers use the term "restitution" quite loosely.5 For
example, judges and lawyers often talk and write about requiring criminals to
make "restitution" to the victims of their crimes.6 These judges and lawyers
then describe a process that requires the criminals to compensate their victims
for losses experienced. This, however, is not restitution. Rather, it is compensa-
tion. Likewise, judges and lawyers often talk and write about requiring
tortfeasors or contract breachers to make "restitution." But these judges and
lawyers then describe a process that requires these wrongdoers to compensate
injured parties for losses. Again, however, this is not restitution, but compensa-
tion.7 Further, people involved in the current debate about the ownership and
return of "cultural treasures" often use the term restitution.8 The Greek people,
goes the argument, and not the British Museum, own the Elgin Marbles. Thus,
those sculptures must be returned to Greece. Again, however, since the
protagonists in these debates often spend most of their time discussing losses
rather than gains, the debates really turn on compensation rather than restitution.
Finally, people involved in civil rights litigation sometimes talk about the need
to make "restitution" to the victims of racial or sexual prejudice.9 These
references, however, generally describe losses to the victims of prejudice rather
than gains to the victimizers. Again, therefore, what actually is being discussed
is compensation rather than restitution.'0
5. This point is also made by Laycock. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 1282-83.
6. Countless discussions of this topic exist. An early and influential one is Alan T. Harland,
Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crimes, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 52 (1982).
7. It is not at all clear how this kind of loose thinking started in connection with the law of
torts and contracts. One thought, however, is this: The notion of "promissory estoppel" only took
solid root in American law during the middle part of the 20th century. Prior to that time, therefore,
mere reliance on a promise could not generate a remedy in contract. Thus, many relying promisees
experienced severe losses for which no compensation seemed available. Since many courts wished
to grant compensation in these situations, however, they simply stated that "restitution" should be
available. Of course, these cases had nothing whatsoever to do with restitution. But, nobody in those
early days seemed to be thinking very carefully about this topic.
8. See, e.g., Jeanette Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures (1989).
9. See, e.g., The Wealth of Races: The Present Value of Benefits from Past Injustices
(Richard F. America ed., 1990).
10. Admittedly, real restitutionary remedies could be employed in all three of the situations just
described. In the criminal context, for example, criminals sometimes sell their stories to the movies.
When they do this, they reap unjust gains. If these gains were the subject of suit, a real claim in
restitution would be raised. Likewise, contract breachers and tortfeasors often experience gains from
their wrongful acts. If judges and lawyers focused on these gains, they would actually be talking
about restitution. Further, if the discussion of cultural treasures turned on the fact that the new
owners gained something unjust, rather than on the fact the original owners lost something unjustly,
then clearly the debate would be one about restitution, Finally, in the civil rights context, attempts
might be made to calculate the gains that Anglo-Saxon people have experienced over the years as
a result of prejudice against African-Americans. These gains-if any way could be devised to
calculate them-might then be the subject of restitutionary claims. On this last point, see School of
Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley, An Illustrative Estinate: The Present
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Second, in many litigation situations, the losses injured parties experience
are equal to the gains injuring parties reap."' When this equality exists, there
is no functional need to differentiate between restitutionary and compensatory
remedies. In many breach of contract situations, for example, the monetary
losses of the non-breaching party are roughly the same as the monetary gains of
the breaching party. The same is true in many tort situations.
However, sometimes a major difference exists between the amount of loss
and the amount of gain. Three kinds of situations tend to produce most cases
in which losses are not equivalent to gains, i.e., when compensation will differ
from restitution.' 2  First, in some situations, losses will exceed gains. In
connection with most incidents involving negligence, for example, the injured
party experiences losses but the injuring party gains nothing. In these situations,
therefore, claims for compensation are all that injured parties can seek. Second,
in some situations, gains as well as losses exist, but the losses significantly
exceed thWe gains. Obviously, in these situations, injured litigants should seek
compensation rather than restitution. Conversely, injuring parties should attempt
to turn claims for compensation into claims for restitution. Third, sometimes,
albeit rarely, gains exceed losses.' 3 In a famous case, for example, someone
made a substantial profit through the use of an "egg-washing" machine that
belonged to someone else. The user reaped a significant gain. The owner of the
machine, however, did not even know it was gone, and thus experienced no real
loss. In this case, as in all comparable ones, a restitutionary remedy produces
a better remedy for the plaintiff than a compensatory remedy.
Major procedural or strategic differences also exist between compensatory
and restitutionary remedies. There are seven in all. First, technical problems
sometimes make it difficult or impossible for an injured party to recover any
compensation at all for losses incurred. 4 For example, a necessary writing
might be missing in a contract case, or some technical aspect of a cause of action
in tort might not be provable. Because the law of restitution does not require
proof of anything other than unjust enrichment, however, these technical
problems would not foreclose a claim for restitution. Second, statutes of
limitations for compensatory and restitutionary remedies may differ significant-
ly."3 The limitation period for restitutionary claims is often substantially longer
than the limitation period for tort claims. Third, procedural or strategic
difference between restitutionary and compensatory remedies involves the
meaning of the term "damages" in some statutes and insurance policies. In an
important recent case, for example, an insurer claimed that the term "damages"
Value of the Benefits from Racial Discrimination, 1929-1969, in The Wealth of Races: The Present
Value of Benefits from Past Injustices (Richard F. America ed., 1990).
11. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 1283-84.
12. Id. at 1284-88.
13. Id. at 1287; Dobbs, supra note 1, § 4.1(1), at 368-69.
14. Laycock, supra note 2, at 1282-86.
15. Dobbs, supra note 1, § 4.1(1), at 369.
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in pertinent statutes and policies did not include claims that are essentially
restitutionary in nature. Hence, the insurer disclaimed liability for such
claims. 16 Fourth, most suits for compensatory money remedies are suits "at
law" while many suits for restitutionary money remedies-most notably suits for
"constructive trusts" or "accounting"-are suits "in equity." Thus, substantial
procedural differences may exist between the way suits for money compensation
and suits for money restitution are prosecuted. Litigants seeking compensatory
money remedies, for example, almost certainly will be able to get jury trials,
whereas litigants seeking restitutionary money remedies may not. Fifth, litigants
seeking remedies in jurisdictions in which long delays exist in connection with
law remedies might be able to move relatively quickly to judgment by seeking
restitution rather than compensation. Sixth, skilled lawyers can sometimes use
claims for restitution as a back door method for collecting punitive damages."
Thus, in jurisdictions in which punitive damages are difficult to obtain, claims
for restitution might lead to essentially punitive awards. Consider, for example,
situations in which someone or some entity consciously balances the likelihood
and costs of injury to others against potential gains and seeks to gain at the
expense of others. (The "exploding Pinto" cases are a perfect example of this.)
In these situations, restitution, i.e., the value of the gain to the wrongdoer, might
provide an equally large money remedy as punitive damages.
The seventh and last strategic difference between compensatory and
restitutionary remedies is perhaps the least understood by most lawyers yet the
most important. This difference turns on the nature of judgments for restitu-
tion. 8 Although many law professors and most law students seem to think that
civil litigation simply ends when courts enter judgments, all experienced
practicing lawyers know the entry of judgments for money or acts is often just
the end of the first part of a long process. Losing defendants, after all, do not
just automatically write out checks when money judgments are entered against
them, or comply with orders to act or not act. Rather, losing defendants often
thumb their noses at the judgments, or, for whatever reason, argue that they
cannot comply. At this stage, a major strategic difference between restitutionary
money remedies and compensatory money remedies comes into play.' 9 As a
general rule, a judgment for a compensatory money claim turns the loss of an
injured party into a "debt" of the injuring party. Injured parties usually can
collect these debts only alongside all of the other debts of the injuring party.
Thus, if the assets of an injuring party are limited, or if other debts of that party
take precedence over the judgment, or if bankruptcy is a viable option, the holder
of a judgment for a compensatory money remedy may end up with little or no
actual money.
16. Id. at 369 n.30 (citing Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 784 P.2d 507 (1990)).
17. This point is indirectly raised in Laycock, supra note 2, at 1288-90.
18. Laycock, supra note 2, at 1290-91.
19. For an extensive discussion of the points made here, see Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive
Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. Ill. L.F. 297.
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Different rules, however, apply to judgments for restitutionary money
remedies. Three such different rules are critical. First, unlike judgments for
compensatory money remedies, which are, essentially, unsecured debts,
judgments for restitutionary money are, in effect, determinations of "owner-
ship." The unjust gain, in short, was never owned by the defendant. If, for
example, a piece of property changes possession because of mistake or fraud, a
judgment for restitution states that the piece of property was never owned by the
defendant. Likewise, if a particular and identifiable pot of money is the source
of unjust enrichment, a judgment for restitution of that pot of money is, in effect,
a statement that the defendant never owned the pot. The consequences of this
are profound. If the item that is the object of a judgement for restitution is in
the possession of the defendant, collection of that judgment takes precedence
over all of the other debts of the defendant. Thus, if the subject of a judgment
for restitution is a particular item or a particular pot of money, the holder of that
judgment can claim the entire value of that pot or the entire value of that thing,
even though the debtor has many other creditors and limited assets. This is so,
of course, because the defendant never actually owned the item.
Second, because judgments for restitution are directly tied to specific things,
changes in values of those things that occur after the wrongful act may accrue
to the benefit of the original owner."' If, for example, a defendant converts
property that subsequently increases in value, the plaintiff in a suit for restitution
might be able to recover the increase. This might not be so if the suit were
brought for compensation.
The third advantage judgments for restitution enjoy over those for compensa-
tion is perhaps even more important than this ownership idea, and turns on the
extraordinarily arcane notion of "tracing." 22 The notion of tracing allows the
holder of a judgment for restitution to trace or follow an unjustly reaped gain
from one form to another. Thus, if the defendant was unjustly enriched by the
acquisition of an object, and if that object is sold or otherwise converted into
money, the holder of the judgment for restitution can trace or follow the thing
to the money. That money itself becomes the object of the secured judgment.
Thereafter, the holder of this judgment can take all of this money even though
the debtor has numerous other creditors and limited assets.
Consider now the extraordinary implications of the differences just noted
between judgments for compensation and judgments for restitution: Assume that
Jones, by fraud, gets both Smith and Adams to sell her their Ming vases for
$100 apiece. (Each vase is worth about $50,000.) Jones then sells the vases and
buys a $100,000 Rolls Royce for her boyfriend. Later, Smith sues Jones in tort
for a compensatory money remedy, and Adams sues Jones for a restitutionary
money remedy based on "constructive trust" theory. Both Smith and Adams
20. Laycock, supra note 2, at 1291.
21. Id. at 1291-92.
22. Id. at 1291.
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obtain judgments for $49,900. Smith's judgment, of course, is for his loss.
Adams's judgment, however, is for Jones's gain. Then the problems begin.
Jones's financial situation is bleak. She has no money. She owes various
creditors approximately $100,000. Her house is completely encumbered with a
mortgage. Finally, her boyfriend has taken up with a new woman, and won't
give back the car.
What then happens with Smith and Adams? Smith, it should be recalled,
has a judgment for a compensatory money remedy. Thus, she has, simply, a
"debt" against Jones. However, since Jones has no assets available to pay her
debts, Smith gets nothing. Further, even if Smith can somehow draw the now-
missing car back into Jones's pool of assets, he would have to share the proceeds
from the sale of that car with all of the creditors. Thus, Smith would only
collect a few cents on his dollar. Adams, however, is in much better shape. He
has a judgment for a restitutionary money remedy. He has, in effect, a
"mortgage" against the specific thing (or money) that constitutes Jones' gain.
Further, Adams gets to "trace" that gain into other forms, including the car now
owned~by Jones's former boyfriend. Ultimately, therefore, Adams may well get
the entire $49,900 of his judgment and avoid the claims of Jones's other
creditors.
Many judges, lawyers, and students might now argue that this discrepancy
of civil remedies is illogical and unjust. In the foregoing situation, of course, the
injuries incurred by Adams and Smith were identical, as were the gains reaped
by Jones. Further, since in this situation losses equaled gains, the only real
difference between the suits brought by Adams and Smith was the name assigned
to the remedy sought. Thus, only a hyper-technical system of civil remedies, a
system with no place in the modem world, would generate the different results
described. Similar factual circumstances ought to generate similar remedial
results.
Rules that create wildly different results in the remedies available within
essentially identical factual circumstances are subject to criticism. Nevertheless,
they are available to practitioners and their clients. Thus, regardless of the
inconsistencies described, the rules of restitution and compensation, as noted,
make the above hypothetical a real possibility, and the restituionary remedy a
significant alternative.
IV. INTANGIBLES
One additional distinction between restitution and compensation now
deserves extended comment. Rules regarding restitution and rules regarding
compensation produce very different results in very similar circumstances in the
context of "intangibles."
Compensatory money remedies deal with two conceptually distinct kinds of
losses: tangible (or economic) losses and intangible (or non-economic) losses.23
23. For an interesting historical discussion of changing notions of "property," notions ultimately
(Vol. 54
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Compensation [Money Re dis
[Tangible Losses I  Non-Tangible Losse~s
Tangible (or economic) losses-which are sometimes called "pecuniary"
losses-are losses that can be readily and precisely converted into money
amounts. To be more precise, tangible losses have physical substance and are
detectable to the senses.24 If, for example, Fretter must spend $5,000 to repair
the damage to her car caused by Henderson, that $5,000 is an economic (or
tangible or pecuniary) loss to Fretter. Likewise, if Prestige loses $10,000 on a
forward contract because of a breach by Tacky, that $10,000 is an economic (or
tangible or pecuniary) loss. Conversely, intangible losses (or non-economic
losses)-which might also be called "non-pecuniary" losses-are losses that
cannot be readily or precisely converted into money amounts. 2 They are losses
that do not have physical substance and are not detectable to the senses.26 If,
for example, Fretter incurred losses due to "pain and suffering" in connection
with the automobile accident just described, compensation for these losses would
be of the non-economic (or intangible or non-pecuniary) type. Or, if the
reputation of Prestige was seriously damaged by the words or actions of Tacky,
the compensation for these losses would be non-economic (or intangible or non-
pecuniary).
That compensation for non-tangible losses should be allowed is generally
undisputed.27 Admittedly, agreement on this issue did not always exist.28
Further, some dispute exists even now as to whether some particular types of
non-economic losses should be compensated. Tort reformers, for example,
believe that limitations should be placed on a plaintiff's ability to recover for
pain and suffering. Also, certain kinds of intangible losses, such as those
involving reputation and privacy are limited by constitutional restraints. And
substantial differences of opinion exist regarding what is, and what is not, an
leading to the two kinds of losses noted here, see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of tie
Nineteenth Century, 29 Buff. L. Rev. 325 (1980). For a discussion of "intangible property" generally,
see Anthony J. Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule,
98 Harv. L. Rev. 1111, 1194-96 (1985).
24. Gordon V. Smith and Russell L. Parr, Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible
Assets 78 (1989).
25. Dobbs, supra note 1, § 3.1.
26. Smith and Parr, supra note 24, at 78.
27. For an excellent summary of the various points often arising in the debate about
compensation for intangible losses, see Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis", 72 Cornell
L. Rev. 765 (1987). Another interesting discussion of intangible losses, this one dealing with such
losses and the RICO statute, is Alan Vinegrad, Comment, Government Corruption and Civil RICO:
Providing Compensation for Intangible Losses, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1530 (1983).
28. See Vandevelde, supra note 23.
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intangible. In their book on valuation of intangibles and intellectual property, for
example, Smith and Parr define intangibles quite broadly.29 Conversely, in his
general treatise on remedies, Dobbs defines intangibles narrowly.30 Neverthe-
less, total agreement now exists: intangible losses can be compensated.
Regrettably, the same thing cannot be said about a comparable notion in the
law of restitution. 31 No agreement whatsoever exists as to whether remedies
are available for intangible gains. However, this lack of consensus is not the
product of scholarly discourse or well-reasoned dissension, but inattention. No
traditional restitution cases have been found, for example, in which the notion
of restitution for intangible gains was addressed. Further, none of the major
commentators on restitution has specifically addressed this issue. 2
This is not to say, however, that restitution for intangible gains is not a
viable remedy. In fact, as the following analysis will demonstrate, it should be
granted. If restitution were granted for intangible gains, the restorative function
of money remedies would duplicate the compensatory function.
IR es tora tiv e [M on ey R e m ed ies ] I
STangible Gains F Intangible Gains I
Interestingly, the notion of restitution for intangible gains, though seemingly
an obscure idea, has come up in three important areas of law: intellectual
property, divorce, and corporations.33 Since these three areas, however, are
29. Smith and Parr, supra note 24.
30. 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Practitioner Treatise Series § 6.5(l) (2d ed. 1993).
31. Levmore has explored this discontinuity between rules dealing with compensation and
restitution at some length. Levmore, supra note 4, at 70-72.
32. Jeanblanc, for example, does not touch on this point in his two important 1950 works on
restitution. Jeanblane I, supra note 4; Jeanblanc II. supra note 4. Likewise, Dawson skips over it
in his important 1959 essay, John P. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 Ohio State L.J. 175
(1959), and Childres and Garamella miss it in their 1969 piece. Childres and Garamella. supra note
4. Further, Perillo, supra note 4, Levmore, supra note 4, Laycock, supra note 2, and Dobbs, supra
note 1, all address the concept of restitution at length, but do not address restitution for intangible
gains. Finally, and most significantly: even Wendy Gordon, whose recent series of essays on
restitution surely constitutes the most provocative discussion to date of that topic, barely hints at the
notion of restitution for intangible gains. Gordon, Of Hamns and Benefits, supra note 4, Gordon, On
Owning Information, supra note 4, and Gordon, An hIquiry, supra note 4.
33. Interestingly, terminology similar to the terminology used in this article has been used in
areas other than these. Further, in other contexts ideas related to those discussed herein have been
described. In these other contexts, however, the actual issues involved are different. Laycock notes.
for example, that the remedy of "specific restitution," a remedy that herein is classified as a
restorative act remedy, can be used to deal with intangibles. Laycock, supra note 2, at 1292-93.
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outside the mainstream of the law of restitution, they have never been examined
together.
Though the law of intellectual property is, by far, the largest repository of
cases granting restitution for intangible gains, hardly any of the cases and
commentary in that field actually discuss this issue.' This lack of discussion
is due to the well-established availability of restitution for intangible gains in this
context. Intellectual property law deals with property that is, almost by
definition, intangible. An idea, for example, is as intangible as anything can be.
But much of the law of intellectual property is designed to protect the rights of
the developer of ideas. Hence, claimants in this context routinely seek
restitutionary remedies. Also, in intellectual property cases the gains to wrong-
acting parties usually are easier to identify and calculate than the losses to the
others. It is much easier to show, for example, that the company that stole an
Plaintiffs sometimes have personal or idiosyncratic reasons for valuing particular things. Id. These
plaintiffs might seek restoration of the particular things rather than the money equivalent of those
things. Id. These situations, however, principally focus on losses rather than gains. Id. Hence, they
do not deal with the topic addressed herein.
Anthony Waters recently advanced a new theory regarding the reasons that third party beneficiaries
may have rights in contract situations. Waters, supra note 23. The rights of a third party beneficiary.
Waters argues, are not'really contractual rights at all. Rather, he suggests, they are a "restitutionary
fight to intangible property." Id. at 1199. This intangible property, according to Waters, is the right
to the benefits of a promise. Although, superficially, Waters' ideas seem to be in alignment with the
analysis in this paper, in fact no similarity exists. When Waters uses the term "restitution," he means
what herein is called "compensation." In other words, in the terminology of the present analysis,
third party beneficiaries have a right to compensation for injuries suffered in connection with a
promise.
The notion of intangible gains or benefits also arises in cases and commentary dealing with the
tort of "wrongful birth." In wrongful birth cases, a child is born due to medical negligence. (Typical
of these cases are situations in which a child is born to a parent who has had a vasectomy or tubal
ligation.) In these situations, courts often conclude that the intangible benefits to the parents of
raising a child outweigh the losses caused by the negligence. See generally James M. Parker, Jr.,
Wrongful Life, 16 St. Mary's L.J. 639, 662-63 (1985).
Finally, the notion of intangible benefits or gains has been addressed by commentators remarking
on judicial reasons for enforcing promises or requiring people to pay in contract situations. Farber
and Matheson, for example, have noted that courts realize that at least some promises have non-
quantifiable yet tangible benefits. Daniel A. Farber and John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory
Estoppel, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 903, 921 n.77 (1985). These intangible benefits can become, in effect,
the consideration needed to make a promise enforceable. Further, several California cases have
addressed the notion of intangible benefits in restitution cases. In Earhart v. William Low Co., 600
P.2d 1344 (Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court, distinguishing an earlier case, suggested that
relatively intangible benefits could satisfy the "direct benefit" requirement of California restitution
law. In Elliott v. Elliott, 231 Cal. App. 2d 205, 41 Cal. Rptr. 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1964), the
court concluded that a constructive trust-i.e., a restitutionary remedy-could come into existence
even if the only benefit to the constructive trustee was intangible. In these cases, however, and in
the cases Farber and Matheson discuss, the notion of providing restitution for the intangible gains
themselves is not specifically addressed.
34. For an excellent discussion of intangible property generally, and intellectual property as a
type of intangible property, see Smith and Parr, supra note 24.
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idea gained $10 million by using it than it is to show that the company that had
the idea lost $10 million due to the theft. Therefore, claimants in intellectual
property cases routinely seek restitutionary remedies.
The point, of course, is this. Though the ideas about restitution of intangible
gains to be described below may well be quite controversial, or even dismissed
out of hand, in at least one very important area of law-intellectual proper-
ty-total agreement exists.
Unfortunately, such uniformity of opinion does not prevail in connection
with the second area of law in which the notion of restitution for intangible gains
arises. Indeed, it is probably safe to say that in this second field-divorce
law-most judges and lawyers hold that restitution should not be granted for
intangible gains. 5
The issue of intangible gains in divorce law generally arises when one
spouse slaves away at home or at a relatively low wage job for several years,
enabling the other spouse to attend a professional school.36 Soon after the
student spouse graduates from school, often quite soon thereafter, divorce ensues.
Then, since this couple has not yet accumulated many tangible assets and since
often no children exist, neither spouse gets much. However, the student spouse
walks away from the marriage with a professional degree. The working spouse
walks away with nothing, or relatively little.
The working spouses in this situation should seek restitution for intangible
gains. From a functional perspective, a claim for restitution should be made in
this situation because the gain to the student spouse-the value of an advanced
degree and the value of a happy family-almost certainly exceeds the loss to the
working spouse-the money equivalent of the work done. Strategic reasons also
suggest using a claim for restitution in this context. As noted earlier, many
claims for restitutionary money remedies, most notably claims for constructive
trusts or an accounting, are claims "in equity" rather than claims at law. Hence,
suits for restitution in this context potentially allow the working spouse to invoke
all of the extraordinary powers of the so-called "equity" courts. Further, suits
for restitution in this context might not be subject to the delays associated with
35. See generally June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A
Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1463 (1990). See also June Carbone and Margaret F. Brinig,
Rethinking Marriage, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 953 (1991); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rents,
16 J. Legal Stud. 267 (1987); Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1989);
Herna H. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56
U. Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault, 23 New Eng. L. Rev. 437
(1988); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev.
9 (1990); Susan Klebanoff, To Love and Obey 'Til Graduation Day-The Professional Degree in
Light of the Uniform Marital Property Act, 34 Am. U. L. Rev.839 (1985).
36. Carbone and Brinig, supra note 35, discusses this situation extensively. For earlier
discussions of this prototype, see Katharine K. Baker, Contracting for Security: Paying Married
Women What They've Earned, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1193 (1988); Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples
and Unjust Enrichment, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 47 (1978); Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing
Spouse's Education, 28 Kan. L. Rev. 379 (1980).
[Vol. 54
RESTITUTION FOR INTANGIBLE GAINS
law remedies and allow for punitive damages. Finally, restitutionary claims carry
with them "security" and "tracing." Hence, though a judgment for compensation
in this context might simply get lost among all of the defendant's other debts, a
judgment for restitution could allow the working spouse to get ahead of the
student spouse's other creditors. This would be particularly important, of course,
if the student spouse had limited assets and many creditors.
June Carbone, who has written extensively on marriage, divorce and
restitution, perhaps best summarizes the rationale for thinking of alimony in
restitutionary terms, and for allowing restitution for intangible gains in the
context of divorce:
37
Restitution provides a way to acknowledge the contributions married
women are continuing to make to childrearing and the accommodations
inevitable in two-career families without a return to a system of life-
long separation [for women] of home and [outside-the-home-work].
Under a restitution system ... the prototypical award will go to a
woman who interrupts a promising career to care for her
children ....
Near the end of her analysis, Carbone specifically makes the point addressed
herein.
By focusing on the benefits rather than the debits of marriage, restitu-
tion offers the possibility of a different approach in symbolic as well as
monetary terms. Under a true restitution system, alimony as a continua-
tion of the guilty husband's duty of support, as a form of welfare for
needy spouses, even as damages for injury inflicted or reliance
misplaced would disappear. In its place would be a reaffirmation of
both spouses' obligations to contribute to the benefits that the marriage
made possible. Those benefits--children and, to a lesser degree,
enhanced earning capacity or lifestyle--often will be intangible....
[R]ecognizing that the benefit conferred and retained after the divorce
gives rise to the obligation will place divorce payments on a different
footing. Such awards will be obligations, not charity, installment
payments for benefits retained, not punishment and not antiquated
remnants of an otherwise severed relationship.39
37. Carbone, supra note 35. See also Carbone and Brinig, supra note 35; Cohen, supra note
35; Ellman, supra note 35; Kay, supra note 35; O'Connell. supra note 35; Scott, supra note 35.
38. Carbone, supra note 35, at 1493 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 1500-01 (footnotes omitted). Baker makes the same point in a similar way.
At marriage dissolution, courts attempt to divide a couple's valuable assets, but many
commonly recognized sources of wealth, even if labelled as property, are very difficult
to divide. Business goodwill, education, employment promotion, and future income
streams are but a few examples of sources of wealth that courts are either reluctant to
define as property or are unable to divide. These sources of wealth provide much of the
economic security in the majority of marriages, and it is precisely these intangible benefits
1993]
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The notion of restitution for intangible gains has also arisen, albeit indirectly,
in cases and commentary dealing with corporation law issues. Dirks v. SEC'
is the most important corporations law case dealing with the notion of intangible
gains. Securities law, Dirks notes, creates liability for insider trading only if the
insider, among other things, obtains a personal benefit.4 Though the securities
laws focus on these benefits as the source of criminal liability, the law of civil
remedies would clearly make them subject to restitutionary claims. Traditionally,
the personal benefit that generated liability in this context was thought to
encompass only quantifiable or economic gains. Thus, insiders were liable only
if they personally reaped financial gain from the trading. Dirks suggested,
however, that something else might be deemed a personal benefit. The majority
suggested, for example, that "reputational benefit[s] that will translate into future
earnings"42 and gifts of information to friends or relatives43 might well satisfy
the personal benefit requirement. The dissent caustically stated that the
foregoing language meant that "the good feeling of exposing a fraud" would
constitute a personal benefit." Such things surely are intangibles.
Dirks spawned a host of cases dealing with insider trading and intangible
personal benefits. Indeed, as Garten notes in her excellent discussion of this
topic, the SEC pursued tippers who obtained personal benefits in the form of
"friendship, sexual favors, desire to impress a celebrity or to obtain the good will
of a professional colleague."4 Admittedly, the SEC has not prevailed in many
of these cases. In fact, it is probably safe to say that, presently, a tangible,
economic benefit is a prerequisite to liability in this context. Nevertheless, the
issue of intangible gains in context of insider trading has clearly been raised, and
the SEC still seems willing to pursue the matter.46
The notion of restitution for intangible gains has also arisen in connection
with the liability of corporate directors. Directors, some cases and commentators
have recently suggested, may be liable for failure to respond to stockholders if
those directors have reaped intangible benefits in connection with their
failure to respond.47 Further, and perhaps more importantly, Heckmann v.
which women are deprived of at marriage- dissolution. This deprivation is particularly
crippling because most women reasonably rely on sharing the intangible benefits
accumulated during the marriage.
Baker, supra note 36, at 1196.
40. 463 U.S. 64,6, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
41. id. at 662, 103 S. Ct. at 3265. An excellent discussion of this topic can be found in Helen
A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 573, 618-22 (1987).
42. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663, 103 S. Ct. at 3266.
43. Id. at 664, 103 S. Ct. at 3266.
44. Id. at 676 n.13, 103 S. Ct. at 3272 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45. Garten, supra note 41, at 618-19 (footnotes omitted).
46. For a further discussion of this point, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Communications
and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 741 at 806-08 (1985).
47. Dennis J. Block et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Litigation
at the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. Law. 469, 479 n.69 (1990). See also Samuel M. Feinberg
Testamentary Trust v. Carter, 652 F. Supp 1066, 1073-74 (S.D.N.Y 1987). The Feinberg ruling,
incidentally, seems to have been rejected by the Delaware courts. Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914,
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Ahmanson48 suggests that intangible benefits might generate liability in the
takeover context. 49 In Heckman, "greenmail" was paid in order to attempt to
avoid a takeover. The intangible benefit of "retention of control" of the
company satisfied the personal benefit requirement of the law.
The notion of intangible gains has also arisen in the corporate context in
connection with fee awards. In an important recent article, Block, Radin, and
Schieffelin note that the Delaware courts have intimated that something other
than loss to lawyers, i.e., hours expended, should be the controlling issue in fee
cases. 0 These writers suggest that Delaware courts are making inquiries into
the gain to the litigants in determining damages, which would represent a move
toward a restitutionary basis for fee awards."' The article suggests that.
Delaware courts are beginning to question whether intangible gains to litigants
are sufficient to justify large fees awards.
One additional point must be made about restitution for intangible gains, a
point addressed directly in the fee cases just noted and in intellectual property
cases, and indirectly in the corporate and marriage cases and commentary. The
problem of "measuring" intangible gains is prevalent in all of these contexts. In
one of the fee cases, for example, a fee award was reduced by more than fifty
percent because the benefit achieved was "so highly speculative that no one has
attempted to define its value." 2 Likewise, all of the commentators on divorce
issues in this context have noted how difficult it is to calculate the money value
of the benefits associated with having, say, happy children, or a stay-at-home
spouse, or an enhanced education. Finally, a host of commentary deals with
valuation issues in intellectual and intangible property cases.5 3
Interestingly, calculation problems come up in one of the very few
comments in the mainstream literature of restitution. Wade squarely addressed
the measuring problem as he stated,54
A reasonably certain measurement of the enrichment is also needed.
Thus, where the plaintiff saves the defendant's life, it certainly would
not be thought that the total value of the defendant's life expectancy is
the measure of the enrichment. There is, indeed, no accurate basis for
measuring the benefit, and this may well be an important reason why
courts have been slow to grant recovery in this situation.55
921-24 (Del. Ch. 1987).
48. 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985).
49. See generally Harvey Gelb, Director Due Care Liability, 61 Temp. L.Q. 13, 41-43 (1988).
50. Dennis J. Block et al., Attorneys' Fee Awards in Derivative and Class Litigation: Recent
Trends in Delaware, in ALI-ABA Course of Study: New Dimensions in Securities Litigation:
Planning and Strategies 275 (1992).
51. Id. at 310-11.
52. Id. (quoting In re Triton Group, Ltd. Shareholders Litigation, No. 11429, 1991 WL 33571
(Del. Ch. 1991)).
53. See, e.g., Smith and Parr, supra note 24.
54. Wade, supra note 4.
55. Id. at 1187 (footnote omitted). See also John P. Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of
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Wade's observation about the difficulty of quantifying the gain reaped from
a saved life reveals the reason why courts outside of the field of intellectual
property do not routinely award restitution for intangible gains. Intangible gains,
Wade's comments suggest, are, by definition, difficult to quantify. Thus, since
remedies necessarily require some quantification, the easy way out for courts is
to simply deny restitution for intangible gains.
Inconsistency arises, however, because intangible losses are also, by
definition, difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, courts now
routinely award remedies for intangible losses. In other words, the quantification
problem that seemingly inhibits courts from awarding remedies for intangible
gains does not trouble them whatsoever when it comes to awarding remedies for
intangible losses. 6
V. CONCLUSION
If, as the foregoing analysis suggests, restitution for intangible gains should
routinely be granted, then an overall chart of the classification system described
herein would look like this. This chart, obviously, does not include the many
sub-ideas flowing from act and declaratory remedies. Nor, of course, does it
include sub-ideas flowing from the tangible/intangible dichotomy. Nevertheless,
it provides a comprehensive picture of the ideas discussed in this article and
places the separate ideas in their appropriate remedial context.
Human Life, in XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law 142 (1961).
56. For an interesting discussion of measurement issues in connection with intangible losses,
see Vinegrad, supra note 27.
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The analysis then comes full circle. The paper began with several
hypothetical situations. In the first of these, technical reasons prohibited a
female employee and an African-American employee from recovery from a male
manager who harassed them. In the second hypothetical, Pecs defrauded an
elderly widow of a beautiful painting. She faced enormous delay if she sought
a legal remedy though her age made time essential. In the third hypothetical, a
university professor with limited assets but many creditors obtained the use for
several years of beautiful resort property by mistake. In the fourth hypothetical,
a manufacturing company consciously chose to develop a dangerous but highly
profitable product believing it was immune from punitive damages. In the last
hypothetical, a political figure plagiarized the work of a student assistant and
reaped enormous reputational gains.
The plaintiffs in all of these situations should seek restitution as well as or
instead of compensation for both functional and strategic reasons. Since, in all
of those hypotheticals, the gains to the wrongdoers were at least equal to-and
probably greater than-the losses to the others, restitution is the preferred
remedy. Further, since in the race/sex harassment case, technical problems
stood in the way of recovering compensation, a claim for restitution that might
circumvent those technicalities is appropriate. Further, since in the fraud/painting
case, delay was a major issue, the speed with which an "equitable" claim in
restitution can be prosecuted is an important consideration. Similar strategic
reasons for seeking restitution are prevalent in the resort property/mistake case.
Arcane notions such as the mortgage-like nature of judgments in restitution and
the doctrine of "tracing" might allow the plaintiff in this situation to collect his
remedy despite the defendant's limited assets and numerous creditors. The
dangerous product case exhibits another strategic advantage of claims for
restitution. As stated, such claims can serve as a back door method for obtaining
punitive damages. Finally, in the politician/plagiarism case, the notion of
governmental or sovereign immunity might limit the ability of the student to
collect compensation for his loss. However, a claim for restitution might not be
hindered by that doctrine.
Also, the potential plaintiffs in all of these hypothetical situations should
seek restitution for intangible (or non-economic) gains as well as, or instead of,
restitution for tangible (economic) gains. Intangible gains clearly arose in each
of these cases. Harassers, after all, clearly reap enjoyment and pleasure from
their acts.57 Further, people who come into the possession of beautiful homes
or paintings clearly reap aesthetic pleasure. Likewise, individuals who
experience exceptional success in business or politics undeniably reap tremen-
dous emotional rewards.
Admittedly, measurement problems will arise if the claimants seek restitution
for intangible gains. At first glance, these problems may seem insurmountable.
57. Interestingly, a similar point comes up in connection with some of the commentary about
Dirks. See Hilary Harp, Outsider Trading After Dirks v. SEC, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 593, 616 n.127 (1984).
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How can the sick pleasure reaped from sexual or racial harassment be quantified?
Likewise, how can a dollar amount be placed on the value of a beautiful view
or the opportunity to look at an exquisite painting? And how can the emotions
associated with great success in business or politics be turned into dollar
amounts? Two easy responses to these measuring problem exist. First, if courts
can measure intangible gains in intellectual property cases-and courts do that
all the time-then surely they can measure such gains in standard cases."
Second, if courts can measure intangible losses in standard cases-and courts do
that all the time-then surely they can measure intangible gains.
58. As noted earlier, Levmore has also explored this point about the discontinuity between rules
dealing with compensation and restitution. Levmore, supra note 4, at 69-72.
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